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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROLAND WEBB, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation, WILLIAM REAGAN, 
individually, and WILLIAM , 
ADAMS, ESQ., individually, ) 
and DOUGLAS T. HALL, ESQ., 
individually, ] 
Defendants-Appellants 
No. 890170-CA 
Category 14(b) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
Jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989). This appeal is taken from the 
final order entered by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable James s. Sawaya presiding, granting 
plaintiff-respondent's motion for partial summary judgment on the 
first cause of action of his amended complaint. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in failing to find genuine 
issues of material fact existed as to whether plaintiff-respondent 
fully performed his contractual duties under the parties' 
agreement? 
2. Did the trial err in failing to find genuine issues 
of material fact existed as to whether the parties' agreement 
completely and accurately reflected the intention of the parties 
at the time they entered into the subject agreement? 
3. Did the trial court err in failing to find genuine 
issues of material fact existed as to whether plaintiff-respondent 
had waived his right to rely on the terms of the agreement as set 
forth in the written contract between the parties? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
determinative. Due to the length of this rule, the text is set 
forth in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about July 7, 1981, plaintiff-respondent, Roland 
Webb, and defendant-appellant William K. Reagan formed defendant-
appellant R.O.A., a Utah corporation. (R. 689-90). With the 
formation of R.O.A., Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., a company 
in which Webb was a majority stockholder, was merged into R.O.A. 
Pursuant to the parties1 agreement, Reagan obtained 80% of the 
stock in R.O.A. and Webb and his wife acquired the remaining 20% 
of the stock in R.O.A. (Id.) 
In conjunction with the parties1 formation of R.O.A., the 
parties agreed on an employment contract for Webb. The employment 
contract required Webb to devote his "best efforts, skill, and 
experience in connection with his employment" to R.O.A. (R. 48-52, 
695-97). See Addendum at pp. 3-7. 
Notwithstanding the parties' agreement requiring Webb to 
devote his best efforts in connection with his employment to 
R.O.A., the record before the trial court contained substantial 
evidence that Webb had breached his employment contract with 
R.O.A. In his deposition of September 6, 1988, Webb testified as 
follows: 
(By Mr. Fishier) How many hours a week 
would you say you're putting in? 
Mr. Anderson: For whom? 
Q. (By Mr. Fishier) For R.O.A., pursuant 
to the contract. 
* * * 
Mr. Fishier: Talking in percentages of 
time? 
* * * 
Mr. Fishier: To the first deposition, okay. 
What I'm asking him is how many hours he 
was putting in. 
Q. Are we talking 20 hours, 40 hours? 
A. Are you talking a week? 
Q. A week, yes. 
A. For the first year I would guess at 
least 35 to 40 hours. 
* * * 
Q. In 1983 how many hours a week did you 
put in on the average? 
A. I would guess probably 35. 
Q. In 1984 on the average per week? 
A. At least 30, possibly — I think 30 
would be a realistic --
Q. In 1985? 
A. Probably 25. 
Q. In '86? 
A. About the same amount. I didn't change 
much. 
(R. 1025 at pp. 35-37) . 
Furthermore, Webb admitted in his deposition that he 
spent considerable amounts of time working on his own advertising 
projects while employed by R.O.A. (R. 1022 at p. 18). Webb 
estimated that during the period of 1983 to 1986, he spent only 
about 80% of his time on behalf of R.O.A. (R. 1025 at p. 48-53). 
Others personally acquainted with Webb observed that he 
was frequently out of the office, frequently handled only private 
matters during company time, and frequently was not involved in 
the day-to-day operations of R.O.A. (R. 868-69). 
In addition, the trial court had before it evidence that 
Webb had failed to perform at least two tasks required of him by 
the president of R.O.A., William K. Reagan. (R. 881-84). 
Webb's contracted employment to R.O.A. also included two 
provisions dealing directly with his compensation: 
4. Compensation. As compensation for 
the services required to be performed by him 
hereunder, the Employee shall receive a 
basic salary of $100,000 per annum, payable 
monthly. 
5. Additional Compensation. The 
Employee shall be entitled to receive 
additional compensation annually equal to 
one percent (1%) of annual net sales of 
outdoor advertising of the company. 
(R. 695). 
There was considerable evidence before the trial court 
that both R.O.A. and Webb intended and agreed that compensation 
under the 1% gross sales provision, i.e., paragraph 5 of the 
employment contract, would be due and payable only at such time as 
R.O.A. had sufficient funds to make payments under the provision. 
(R. 876-78, 881-84). In addition, evidence was produced that 
R.O.A. and Webb intended and agreed that Webb?s "basic salary" of 
$100,000 per annum was to be paid in $85,000 cash per year, plus 
$15,000 in "trades." (Id.; R. 51, 52). R.O.A. presented evidence 
that pursuant to the parties' employment contract, from 1981 to 
1986, Webb had received at least $332,608.54 in cash and $15,241.18 
in reported trades. (R. 878). Webb, on the other hand, contended 
that he had received only $3 34,447.00 in cash and trades pursuant 
to the contract. (R. 702). 
Prior to January 11, 1985, R.O.A. experienced severe 
financial difficulties. At that time, R.O.A. agreed through its 
board of directors, of which Roland Webb was a member, to obtain a 
loan from Massachusetts Mutual which included a restriction 
limiting the total annual salary of Roland Webb to $105,000. (R. 
881-84). During the term of Webb's employment to R.O.A. from 
August 1, 1981 until August 1, 1986, R.O.A. never had sufficient 
funds to pay Webb or William K. Reagan under the gross sales 
provision of their respective employment contracts. (id. 881-84). 
On or about May 28, 1987, Webb filed the instant action 
in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, alleging 
several causes of action against defendants-appellants, including 
a claim that R.O.A. had breached their employment contract. (R. 
2-20, 33-78). R.O.A. answered Webb's complaint, denying that it 
had breached the employment contract, and asserting that R.O.A.'s 
performance under the contract was excused due to Webb's 
nonperformance. (R. 202-72). 
On or about August 4, 1988, Webb moved the trial court 
for partial summary judgment against defendant-appellant R.O.A. on 
count one of his amended complaint, claiming that he was entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law for the sum of $342,747.00 for 
R.O.A.fs breach of the employment contract. (R. 810-12). Oral 
argument on the motion was heard before the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, District Judge, on or about November 7, 1988. Judge 
Sawaya issued a minute entry on or about November 9, 1988, finding 
that Webb was entitled to judgment as a matter of law for R.O.A.'s 
breach of the employment agreement. (R. 937-38). The order 
granting Webb's motion for partial summary judgment in the amount 
of $342,747.00, and certifying the same as final under Rule 54(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was entered on or about 
January 5, 1989. (R. 966-68). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in failing to find that genuine 
issues of material fact existed that precluded the entry of 
partial summary judgment in favor of Webb on his first cause of 
action. The evidence before the trial court demonstrated the 
existence of substantial issues as to whether Webb had fully 
performed his duties and obligations under the employment 
contract, whether the written contract fully and accurately 
reflected the parties' intentions, and whether Webb waived his 
right to rely on the contract, as written. Due to the existence 
of genuine issues of material fact, this court should reverse and 
remand the actions of the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST AS TO 
WHETHER WEBB FULLY PERFORMED HIS CONTRACTUAL 
DUTIES. 
A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure must establish that there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 
P. 2d 624 (1960). In addition, the contentions of the party 
opposing the motion must be considered in a light most 
advantageous to him and all doubts must be resolved in favor of 
permitting the matter to be submitted to the trier of fact. 
Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harmen, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d 
807 (1966). In considering a motion for summary judgment, it is 
inappropriate for a trial court to consider the weight of disputed 
evidence or the credibility of witnesses; the sole inquiry to be 
determined is whether there is a material issue of fact to be 
decided. Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304 
(Utah 1987). On appeal, this Court's standard in reviewing the 
trial court's ruling on Webb's motion for summary judgment is 
identical to that standard used by the trial courts. Lucky Seven 
Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
Plaintiff brought suit against R.O.A. claiming that he 
had fully performed the provisions of his employment contract with 
R.O.A. R.O.A., in turn, answered his amended complaint by 
asserting that its performance under the contract was excused, in 
whole or in part, due to Webb's own breach of the employment 
contract. The determination of whether a contract has been 
breached is ordinarily a question for the trier of fact to 
determine from the facts and circumstances. 17 Am.Jur.2d 
Contracts §355 (1964). 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized in Heywood v. Ogden 
Motor Car Co., 7 Utah 417, 266 P.2d 1040 (1928), that the 
determination of whether a breach of contract has occurred is 
ordinarily a question of fact. In Heywood, the plaintiff brought 
suit for past due rents under a lease agreement, and for other 
damages resulting from the defendant's alleged breach of the lease 
agreement. Defendant counterclaimed, alleging it was entitled to 
a setoff under the contract due to the plaintiff's alleged breach 
of the lease. Defendant asserted that it had been deprived of the 
use of the lease premises during a portion of the lease. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, presented evidence that the 
defendant had accepted the keys to the premises on the day the 
lease was to begin. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the 
trial court found that the defendant's acceptance of the keys 
constituted constructive possession of the premises, and 
instructed the jury that the defendant was not entitled to recover 
anything by way of a setoff. The trial court also instructed the 
jury to enter a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the breach of 
contract claim. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in reversing and remanding the 
matter for a new trial, found that the evidence of a mutual breach 
of contract was in sufficient conflict so as to create genuine 
issues of material fact thereby precluding a summary determination 
of liability under the lease agreement. 
The evidence before the trial court in the instant action 
clearly established that genuine issues of material fact exist in 
this case. Questions of fact as to whether either or both the 
parties breached the employment contract, whether any such 
breaches were material, i.e., whether such breach excused either 
party's performance under the contract, and what damages, if any, 
were sustained by Webb as a result of any breach by R.O.A. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Lowe v. Rosenlof, 12 Utah 2d 
190, 364 P.2d 418 (1961), recognized that a party suing for breach 
of contract must establish his own performance under the contract 
as a condition precedent to the entry of judgment in his favor. 
In Lowe, the plaintiff contractor brought suit to recover monies 
allegedly due under a subcontract with the defendant. Plaintiff 
was hired to do concrete work on a school project. After more 
than 70% of the concrete work was done, defendant took the job 
over from plaintiff. Plaintiff then brought suit, alleging that 
he was forced off the job and not allowed to complete it. The 
defendant claimed that the plaintiff had abandoned the job due to 
his precarious financial condition. In discussing the plaintiff's 
burden of proof at trial, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
It is an elementary principle of the law of 
contracts that in order to recover upon a 
contract, [a party] . , . must first 
establish his own performance or a valid 
excuse for his failure to perform. 
Lowe, 364 P.2d at 421 (quoting Miller v. Young, 197 Okla, 503, 172 
P.2d 994, 995 (1946). Likewise, in Malot v. Hadley, 86 Or.App. 
687, 740 P.2d 804, 805-06 (1987), the court stated: 
[A] party to a contract who alleges that the 
other party has breached must prove 
performance of the party's own obligations 
under the contract or demonstrate a valid 
tender of performance that was rejected. 
See also, Holland Development, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Consultant, 
Inc., 81 Or.App. 57, 724 P.2d 844, 849 (1986). 
Once R.O.A. produced evidence tending to show that Webb 
breached his duties under the employment contract, it was highly 
inappropriate for the trial court to grant summary judgment in 
favor of Webb. The determination of the materiality of Webb's 
alleged breach must be submitted to the trier of fact. See State 
v. Scott, 59 Or.App. 25, 650 P.2d 158 (1982); Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts §§241 and 242 (1981). Only after the materiality of 
Webb's alleged breach has been determined by a trier of fact can 
there be a determination of whether R.O.A.fs duties under the 
employment contract were discharged, either in whole or in part. 
The determination of the materiality of Webb's alleged 
breach furthermore affects the resolution of the issue of damages 
in the instant case. The trial court had before it a genuine 
issue of material fact as to the amount of compensation Webb 
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actually received under the employment contract. (R. 702, 878). 
Due to the existence of such a conflict, the trial court erred in 
entering judgment as a matter of law in favor of Webb in the 
amount of $342,747.00. 
POINT II. 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST AS TO 
WHETHER THE WRITTEN CONTRACT FULLY OR 
ACCURATELY REFLECTS THE INTENTION OF THE 
PARTIES. 
While as a general rule, the terms of a written contract 
cannot be varied by parol evidence, "the parol evidence rule as a 
principle of contract interpretation has a very narrow 
application." Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah-
1985). The Utah Supreme Court recognized in Union Bank that the 
parol evidence rule has no application to a non-integrated 
contract, i.e., a written contract was not intended by the parties 
to reflect the entire agreement. R.O.A. demonstrated that the 
R.O.A. and Webb did not intend the written contract of employment 
to encompass or incorporate the entire agreement between them. 
The written contract merely states that Webb's "basic salary" is 
to be $100,000 per annum. There is no indication what portion of 
that salary is to be paid in cash or trades. However, R.O.A. 
produced evidence demonstrating that the parties clearly intended 
that the salary would be divided between cash payments and items 
received in trade from R.O.A.fs clients. In addition, the trial 
court had evidence before it that the written contract did not 
incorporate the condition, clearly understood and agreed upon by 
the parties, that R.O.A. must turn a profit and have sufficient 
cash available to it before the 1% gross sales provision could be 
paid to Webb. 
The parol evidence rule likewise did not preclude R.O.A. 
from introducting evidence of the negotiations leading up to the 
eventual formation of the employment contract, especially where 
such evidence shows that the executed written contract does not 
state accurately the intention of the parties. See, Brean v. 
North Campbell Professional Building, 26 Ariz.App. 381, 548 P.2d 
1193, 1196 (1976) . 
In Union Bank, the Utah Supreme Court also noted that the 
parol evidence rule does not bar parol evidence of the 
circumstances under which a contract is negotiated and executed. 
In Union Bank, defendants, Ronald and Marjorie Swenson, executed a 
promissory note in favor of plaintiff bank. The Swensons signed 
the note "individually and personally." Ronald Swenson also 
signed the note in his capacity as president of State Lumber, Inc. 
Upon default on the note, plaintiff brought suit against State 
Lumber and the Swensons in their individual capacity. The 
Swensons contested their personal liability. 
The Swensons submitted affidavits to that effect in 
opposition to the plaintiff's motion. The trial court, applying 
the parol evidence rule, found no genuine issue of material fact 
and granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, and the 
Swensons appealed. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court's ruling. In so ruling, the Court held: 
The parol evidence rule as a principle of 
contract interpretation has a very narrow 
application. Simply stated, the rule 
operates in the absence of fraud to exclude 
contemporaneous conversations, statements, 
or representations offered for the purpose 
of varying or adding to the terms of an 
integrated contract. Therefore, a court 
must first determine whether the writing 
was intended by the parties to be an 
integration. In resolving this preliminary 
question of fact, parol evidence, indeed, 
any relevant evidence is admissible. 
Parol evidence is admissible to show the 
circumstances under which the contract was 
made or the purpose for which the writing 
was executed. This is so even after the 
writing is determined to be an integrated 
contract. Admitting parol evidence in such 
circumstances avoids the judicial enforcement 
of a writing that appears to be a binding 
integration but in fact is not. 
What appears to be a complete and 
binding integrated agreement may be 
a forgery, a joke, a sham, or an 
agreement without consideration, or 
it may be voidable for fraud, duress, 
mistake, or the like, or it may be 
illegal. Such invalidating causes 
need not and commonly do not appear 
on the face of the writing. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §214, 
Comment C (1981). 
* * * 
Protection against judicial enforcement of 
writings that appear to be binding integra-
tions but in fact are not lies in the pro-
vision that all relevant evidence is admissible 
on the threshold issue of whether the writing 
was adopted by the parties as an integration 
of their agreement. This appears to be so 
even if the writing clearly states it to be 
a complete and final statement of the parties' 
agreement. 
Id. at 665. In remanding the matter to the trial court, the Court 
held that the Swensons' affidavits raised genuine issues of 
material fact as to whether the parties assented to the written 
contract as a final statement of their intended agreement or 
whether the parties executed it for some other reason or purpose. 
Id. at 666. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen 
Brothers Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1983), also held that the 
issue of whether a contract is integrated and reflects the 
parties' intent involves inherent questions of fact that must be 
decided by the trier of fact. In Colonial Leasing, the plaintiff 
leasing company transferred possession of a piece of heavy 
construction equipment to defendant pursuant to a document called 
a "lease." When defendant defaulted on the payments required by 
that document, plaintiff sued for damages. The "lease" contained 
an integration clause and expressly required return of the 
equipment upon expiration of the lease term. Plaintiff moved for 
summary judgment. 
Defendant's affidavits in opposition to summary judgment 
stated that it was the trade, custom and usage in the business to 
accord lessees an option to purchase leased equipment at the end 
of the lease and that plaintiff had orally granted defendant an 
option to purchase the equipment at the end of the lease period. 
Defendant contended that the agreement was a contract to purchase, 
rather than a lease. The trial court held that the parol evi-
dence regarding an option to buy the equipment was inadmissible, 
and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 
Upon appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded the case, holding that the affidavits submitted by the 
defendant created an issue of fact on "whether the purported lease 
was an integrated writing." Id_. at 487, The Court also noted 
that parol evidence is admissible "where the character of the 
written agreement itself is ambiguous even though its specific 
terms are not ambiguous." Ld. The court found that under 
circumstances such as those presented in the instant appeal, a 
trial court should be reticent to grant summary judgment: 
Only when contract terms are complete, clear, 
and unambiguous can they be interpreted by a 
judge on a motion for summary judgment. If 
the evidence as to the terms of an agreement 
is in conflict, the intent of the parties as 
to the terms of the agreement is to be 
determined by the jury. In sum, whether a 
lease was intended as security for a sale 
is a question to be determined on the facts 
of each case, as is the issue of whether 
the nature of the document raises questions 
of fact that preclude summary judgment. 
Id. at 488 (emphasis added). 
The evidence produced by R.O.A. in opposition to the 
plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment established that 
the written employment contract did not represent the entire 
agreement between the parties, nor did the written contract 
accurately reflect the parties' intentions. Evidence of the 
parties' prior agreements and negotiations are admissible because 
the contract is not a fully integrated document. Such evidence 
likewise assists the trier of fact in understanding the meaning of 
the terms used in the written contract. See, Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, §214(c) (1981). Such evidence was also relevant to 
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show that the parties omitted pertinent portions of the terms of 
the employment contract, including the omission of a condition 
precedent to R.O.A.'s duty to pay the 1% gross sales compensation. 
See, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §§216 and 217 (1981). Due 
to the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to the 
integrated nature of Webb's employment contract and the parties' 
intentions in entering into the agreement, this Court should 
reverse and remand the trial court's entry of partial summary 
judgment in favor of Webb. 
POINT III. 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST AS TO 
WHETHER WEBB WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO RELY ON THE 
TERMS OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACT. 
Parol evidence is also clearly admissible in the instant 
case to show a subsequent waiver of an express contractual 
provision. Linear v. Standard Hardware Co., 423 So.2d 966 (Fla. 
Dist.Ct.App. 1982); Pipe Industry Fund Trust v. Consolidated Pipes 
Trades Trust, 760 P.2d 711 (Mont. 1988); Glenmark Associates v. 
Americare of West Virginia, Inc., 371 S.E.2d 353, 356 (W.v. 1988). 
Such a waiver may be shown by agreement of the parties, parol 
evidence, or the parties' course of conduct. First Capitol 
Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Corp., 47 Ill.App. 699, 365 N.E.2d 66, 
72 (1977) (Jiganti, J., dissenting). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Zeese v. Siegel, 5 34 P.2d 85 
(Utah 1975), recognized that the parties' course of conduct 
provides persuasive evidence of what the parties intended at the 
time a written contract was executed* In Zeese, the plaintiffs 
brought an unlawful detainer action against the defendant to 
recover possession of certain real property. At the time, 
defendant was selling trailers and recreational vehicles on the 
premises. Plaintiffs originally leased the property to a third 
party for an initial term of 10 years with an option for an 
additional 10 years. Following a series of subleases, the 
property was assigned to Max Siegel. By terms of the lease, such 
an assignment was permissible without the consent of plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs were promptly notified of the assignment to Mr. Siegel. 
Siegel took possession of the property in May, 1969, and later 
gave notice of the exercise of the option to renew the lease for 
an additional 10 years. Thereafter, plaintiffs visited the 
property on numerous occasions and observed defendant's business 
practices. Defendant continued to pay monthly lease payments of 
$200.00 through June, 197 3 to plaintiffs. Until June, 197 3, 
plaintiffs never gave defendant any notice that defendant was 
holding the premises as a month-to-month tenant or that plaintiffs 
considered defendant's use of the property to be in contravention 
of the lease's use covenant. In reliance on the validity of the 
assignment, defendant purchased various structures on the 
premises and made other improvements to the property. 
Plaintiffs brought suit claiming that the defendant was 
a month-to-month tenant who had improperly refused to vacate the 
premises or in the alternative, that if the defendant had a valid 
leasehold interest, the interest was subject to forfeiture due to 
the defendant's breach of the use covenant in the lease agreement. 
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The trial court found the defendant's use of the premises did not 
violate the use covenant and that the assignment of the leasehold 
interest to defendant was valid. The court also found that the 
plaintiffs had waived and were estopped from asserting any 
defects either in the assignment or in the exercise of the option 
to renew. Plaintiffs appealed. 
On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the trial court had 
erred in admitting parol evidence that supported a finding that 
the lease agreement was valid. In affirming the actions of the 
trial court, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
[I]t is unnecessary for this court to construe 
[the use covenant] independently of the inter-
pretation made by the parties to this action. 
Plaintiffs had had actual notice from the day 
defendant went into possession of the type of 
use being made of the premises. Although 
George Zeese was frequently upon the premises 
he never expressed an opinion that defendant's 
use was in violation of the covenant. 
Under the doctrine of practical construction, 
when a contract is ambiguous and the parties 
place their own construction on their agreement 
and so perform, the court may consider this as 
persuasive evidence of what their true intention 
was. The parties, by their action and perfor-
mance, have demonstrated what was their meaning 
and intent; the contract should be so enforced 
by the courts. 
Id. at 89-90. 
The affidavits of Norman Clark and William K. Reagan 
demonstrated that the parties understood and agreed that both the 
$100,000 per annum salary and the 1% gross sales compensation 
provisions were subject to unwritten conditions and terms. (R. 
876-78, 881-84). Furthermore, the parties1 undisputed course of 
conduct contradicts the construction of the employment contract 
adopted by the trial court. This is such a case where "the 
parties, by their action and performance, have demonstrated what 
was their meaning and intent; [and] the contract should be so 
enforced by the courts." Id. at 90. At a minimum, genuine issues 
of material fact exist as to whether Webb waived his right to rely 
on the compensation provisions contained in the written contract. 
Although the doctrine of estoppel is not expressly 
mentioned or relied upon in the Utah Supreme Court's rulings in 
Colonial Leasing Co., Union Bank, and Zeese, each of those cases 
supports the proposition that a party may be estopped from 
relying on the provisions of a written contract where certain 
contemporaneous understandings and representations were made with 
the intent of inducing another party to enter into a written 
contract. Under the doctrine of estoppel, a party to a contract 
may by his acts or conduct be prevented from denying in court the 
effect or results of those acts. Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 
464 P.2d 598 (Utah 1970). Estoppel should be utilized by a court 
in order to prevent an injustice to a party who has, without 
fault, been deluded into a particular course of action by 
another. Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 
1976). 
The evidence submitted by R.O.A. in opposition to Webb's 
motion for partial summary judgment establishes that during the 
negotiations leading up to the execution of the written employment 
contract that the parties understood and agreed that Webb's salary 
was to be paid in a combination of cash and trades, and that the 
1% gross sales provision would not be paid to plaintiff unless 
R.O.A. had sufficient funds to make such payments. In reliance 
upon that understanding, the parties executed the written 
contract. Evidence supporting the defense of estoppel should have 
been submitted to the trier of fact for consideration. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, defendants-appellants 
respectfully request that this Court reverse and remand this 
action to the trial court for a resolution of the genuine issues 
of material fact, 
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ADDENDUM 
RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(b) For defending party. A party against 
whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motions and proceedings thereon. The 
motion shall be served at least 10 days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. 
The adverse party prior to the day of 
hearing may serve opposing affidavits. 
The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may 
be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue 
as to the amount of damage. 
* * * 
(e) Form of affidavit; further testimony; 
defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, 
and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts 
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall 
be attached thereto or served therewith. 
The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary 
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judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavit or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not 
so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against 
him. 
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT, made and effective on August 1, 1981, 
by and between R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a Utah corporation, 
(hereinafter the "Employer" or "Company"), and ROLAND VJEBB 
(hereinafter the "Employee"). 
1. Term. The term of employment shall commence on the 
1st day of August, 1981 and shall continue until August 1, 1986. 
2. Nature of Employment and Services. Employee shall be 
employed as Chairman of the Board and Vice President and agrees to 
provide such other duties as may be assigned to him by the Board of 
Directors. 
3. Time Devoted to Employment. Employee agrees to use 
his best efforts, skill and experience in connection with his 
employment.
 s 
4. Compensation. As compensation for the services 
required to be performed by him hereunder, the Employee shall 
receive a basic salary of $100,000 per annum, payable monthly. 
5. Additional Compensation. Employee shall be entitled 
to receive additional compensation annually equal to one percent 
(1%) of annual net sales of outdoor advertising of the Company. 
6. Termination. The Employer may not terminate this 
Agreement for any reason other than fraud or gross malfeasance. 
7. Death Benefits. If the Employee should die during the 
term of this Agreement, the Employer will pay the compensation the 
Employee would have been entitled to receive over any remaining term 
of the Agreement to the Employee's estate. 
8. Records Upon Termination. Upon termination of this 
Employment Agreement, at the end of its terra or otherwise. Employee 
agrees to promptly turn over all books, records, information, 
documents, customer lists, instructions and all other instruments 
pertaining to the business of Employer to Employer. 
9. Non-Cornpe t i tion. 
9.1 Employee acknowledges that continued employment 
by the Company will build an intangible asset, of goodwill of 
value to the Company. In consideration of the employment of 
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Employee by the Company and of the performance by the Company of 
the other terms and conditions of this Agreement, Employee 
agrees that, during the term of this Agreement and for a period 
of five^(5) years following the date of termination of this 
Agreement tor any reason whatsoever, he will not knowingly, 
directly or indirectly, own, manage, operate, jointly control, 
lend money to, endorse the obligations of, or participate in or 
be connected with as an officer, employee, stockholder, partner, 
counselor, adviser, or otherwise, any business engaged to any 
extent in the outdoor advertising business nor will Employee 
solicit site leases or customers for such business: (a) within 
a fifty (50) mile radius of the present as well as any future 
office site where he performs -or will perform services under 
this contract, or (b) within a fifty (50) mile radius of any 
outdoor advertising plant previously served by Employee in any 
capacity for the Company. Employee acknowledges that the remedy 
at law for any breach of this provision will be inadequate, and 
that the Company, or its assigns shall be entitled to injunctive 
relief should Employee breach this provision. 
The parties intend that this covenant shall be 
construed as a series of separate covenants, one for each county 
encompassed within the area described. Except for geographic 
coverage, each such separate covenant shall be deemed identical 
in terras to the covenant contained in the preceding paragraph. 
If, in any judicial proceeding, a court shall refuse to enforce 
any of the separate covenants on the ground of unreasonable 
area, then this unenforceable covenant shall be deemed 
eliminated from these provisions for the purpose of those 
proceedings to the extent necessary to permit the remaining 
separate covenants to be enforced. If, in any judicial 
proceeding, a court shall refuse to enforce any of the separate 
covenants on the ground of unreasonable time, then the time of 
noncompetition shall be reduced to a reasonable time. 
-2-
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Employee has carefully read the provisions of this 
paragraph and agrees that the time period and geographical area 
of restriction are fair and reasonable and are necessary for the 
protection of the Company's interests. 
9.2 Employee agrees that upon termination of this 
Agreement for any reason whatsoever, Employee will not solicit 
any of the customers or site lessors of the outdoor advertising 
plant owned by the Company at the time of termination, nor will 
Employee offer to hire, or in fact employ or enter into any 
partnership, corporation or other business relationship, 
directly or indirectly, any of the employees, managers, or 
independent contractors of the Company for a period of five (5) 
years after termination of this Agreement. Employee 
acknowledges that the intangible asset of the goodwill of the 
Company and the outdoor advertising plant managed by Employee 
will be damaged significantly should such customers be solicited 
or employees hired by Employee, and, further, as an amount 
arrived at in good faith by both parties on the date of this 
Agreement and estimated to reasonably compensate the Company for 
the monetary loss which the Company sustains, Employee agrees to 
pay to the Company or its assigns Three Hundred Thousand and 
no/100 Dollars ($300,000.00) in the event of a breach of this 
covenant, 
10. Successors and Assigns. This Agreement shall inure 
to the benefit of and be binding upon Employer and its successors 
and assigns, and upon Employee, and his heirs, beneficiaries, 
legatees and his executor or administrator. 
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• Jurisdiction. This Agreement shall be governed by 
the laws of Utah. 
EMPLOYER: R.O.A. GENERAL^-INC. 7 
EMPLOYEE: 
'Holantf'Kctib' 
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July 7, 1981 
Mr. William Reagan 
c/o Reagan Outdoor Advertising 
Salt Lake City# Utah 
Dear Bill: 
This letter will constitute an amendment to ray 
employment agreement with R.O.A. General, Inc. when that 
document is finalized, a copy of which is attached to this 
letter. 
If you find the terms of this letter to be a 
satisfactory understanding of our modification of that 
employment agreement, as eventually executed in its present 
form, please sign the copy of this letter and return it to me 
for ray files. 
It is ray understanding that I am entitled to 
receive, in addition to the compensation set forth in the 
employment agreement, two motor vehicles comparable in price 
and quality to the two vehicles which I am now provided, 
namely, a 1980 Pontiac Bonneville, and a 1979 Jeep Wagoneer 
Limited. In addition, in connection with the use of those 
automobiles, the company will reimburse me for any 
expenditures relating to automobile expense, including 
maintenance and repair. In the event of my death, it is ray 
understanding that ray estate could elect to continue the use 
of one such vehicle, and could elect to receive $500.00 cash 
each month in lieu of the other vehicle, and therefoire, only 
maintenance and repairs would be required on the one retained 
vehicle. 
With respect to ray compensation while employed by 
the company, it is my understanding that any trades which are-
used by me for my personal use as opposed to business use^A-*' 
will be charged to me at the rate of 50% of the face value of 
the trade, and will be reduction in the sums I am entitled to 
under the terms of the employment agreement. 
Of course, it is also ray expectation that the 
company will reimburse for any expenditures relating to 
conventions, business entertaining, liberal use of available 
tickets, normal clubs and other trade items which axe made 
available to the company. 
0ouoS* 
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Mr, William Reagan 
July 7, 1981 
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I understand that I am to retain my present office 
space, and that the compensation which we have agreed upon 
for the five-year period is non-cancellable for any reason, 
including death, and that it has been calculated based on ray 
providing services in the first through fifth year of 
approximately 50% of my time in the first year, and in each 
of the second through fifth years, the following respective 
percentages of my time: 25%, 123£%, 73£%, 5%. 
With respect to the competition agreement in the 
employment agreement, you are aware that I am a majority 
stockholder in Palmer Outdoor Advertising, and of course 
that ownership is not considered to be competitive with the 
business of R.O.A. General, Inc., and that I am entitled to 
engage in business activities o#/€£^t corporation outside 
the State of Utah . < ^ ^ 4 ^ ^ £ ^ 
With respect to your employment contract, a copy of 
which is also attached, we have also agreed that you will be 
entitled to the same types of benefits that I am, except 
that you will receive, three automobiles and convention 
travel expenses for your wife, as well as miscellaneous club 
and other entertaining expenses. 
We have also agreed that effective August 1, 1983, 
we would determine to what extent your fatherfs salary could 
be justified at its present level of $24,000.00 a year, and 
to the extent that he was not rendering services of that 
value, then any sums which were not being earned would 
constitute a reduction in your compensation arrangement 
under your employment contract. 
I look forward to a lengthy and profitable 
association with you. 
Yours >tfery truly, 
ROLAND WEBB 
>0^~ 
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